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Abstract  
Area-based regeneration projects have captured the imagination of diverse assemblages of 
community actors, governmental interests, and commercial stakeholders around the world. 
Their appeal derives from claims that they are exemplary instruments for combating 
intertwined social, economic, and environmental issues in an integrated manner. 
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of such initiatives remains contentious and continues to 
provoke divergent views. In the midst of an era of fiscal austerity, demands for increasing 
“returns on investments” and maximizing “value for money” have risen to the forefront. This 
paper investigates an area-based regeneration initiative in Europe that has been lauded for 
successfully achieving its regeneration outputs. Yet the research examines whether hitting 
narrowly constructed (economic) targets may be missing the point of yielding holistic 
(community) outcomes. Of broader international and theoretical significance, the merits of 
output-driven regeneration strategies are questioned.  
 
Key words: area-based regeneration, measuring success, New Public Management, outputs, 
targets 
 
Introduction 
Holistic urban regeneration strategies, especially area-based variants, are predominantly 
devised to grapple with entrenched and intertwined social, economic, and environmenta l 
issues (Dargan, 2009; McArdle, 2012; Tyler et al., 2013). Nevertheless, precise definitions 
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vary across countries, policy initiatives, organizations, and actors. Distinct regeneration 
endeavors have captured the imagination of diverse groupings of community actors, 
governmental interests, and commercial stakeholders; spawning a myriad of partnerships, 
governance networks, and institutional configurations around the world, not least in the 
United States (US) and Europe. Area-based strategies have appealed to community 
development activists, professional “regenerators”, and public policymakers alike, in part as 
an antidote to area abandonment, socioeconomic deprivation, and urban decay. Thus, 
regeneration can be conceptualized as a social safety-net and springboard to prosperity 
(Havers, 2013; Pugalis & McGuinness, 2013). The regeneration process comprises a 
constellation of diverse objectives, principles, and ideological presuppositions; as a result, it 
can be argued that the course(s) of action and inaction that are taken are neither necessarily 
transparent nor objective, a point which accords with a post-positivist ontology. Under that 
view, the ultimate objective of a specific regeneration project is never pre-given, but is 
derived by a sociopolitical and negotiated course of activity.  
Over several decades pressing calls have been made to assess the capacity of 
intervention strategies in addressing sociospatial polarization trends that are a defining 
feature of the modern metropolis (Dreier et al., 2013; Harvey, 1973). The complexity of 
regeneration endeavors has also raised concerns about existing modes of capturing outcomes 
(Tyler et al., 2013) and especially the limitations of narrow frameworks of targets (Lefebvre, 
2003 [1970]; Punter, 2007), which appear to favor a rather limited menu of quantitative 
measures.  
The ascendency of evidence-ba sed policy during the 2000s (Kisby, 2011), coupled 
with more recent pressures on state finances and fiscal purging in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis, have combined to demand enhanced returns on investments and value for 
money. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of area-based initiatives remains contentious and 
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continues to provoke divergent views (McArdle, 2012). This would suggest the value of 
utilizing different methodological techniques for evaluating and measuring project outcomes. 
It is against this background that Arbaci and Tapada-Berteli (2012) have argued the benefits 
arising from “reconsidering success.” Using New Public Management (NPM) techniques and 
their influence on urban policy, the paper examines the application and merits of targetry 
frameworks that feature prominently in European community and economic development 
schemes.1 
Shaped by epistemological concerns that stress the importance of spatial particularity, 
the case study is selected as a method to investigate European urban regeneration practice. 
The goal, therefore, is for research findings to convey empirical depth as opposed to 
empirical breadth. The Sunniside Area Regeneration Initiative in England, which has been 
lauded for successfully achieving its official outputs, is critically probed and the logic of 
decision-making is analyzed. Being of both theoretical and policy relevance, the case study is 
used to illuminate the potentially much broader pattern that regeneration programmes may be 
hitting their targets but often missing the point of improving social, economic, and 
environmental conditions in a manner sensitive to the particularities of place. Unpacking and 
scrutinizing the merits of an output-driven regeneration strategy, the research helps to expose 
the politics at play in setting such targets, challenging the objectiveness of “factual” targetry 
frameworks.  
The remainder of the paper is divided into seven substantive parts. Part one critically 
reviews some of the major ideological predispositions informing contemporary area-based 
regeneration practice. This discussion provides the conceptual scaffolding for the empirical 
body of research. Sunniside, located in the English city of Sunderland, is contextualized in 
part two before summarizing the methodological approach in part three, followed by a brief 
exploration of the institutional jigsaw in part four. The setting of strategic objectives and 
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mechanisms for measuring success is then analyzed in part five and a broader critique of hard 
outputs ensues in part six. The final section concludes with a summary of the key research 
findings. 
 
Area-based regeneration practice: ideological predispositions 
Area-based regeneration initiatives are part of a broader suite of urban policies that are 
usually administered to help combat complex socioeconomic processes that produce specific 
spatial manifestations (Pugalis & McGuinness, 2013). It is such materializations that often 
give rise to spatial categorizations and stereotypes, such as skid row, the ghetto, or sink 
estate. Typically, area-based interventions are designed as a curative form of urbanism – over 
and beyond universal welfare policies – to help resuscitate these supposedly “lifeless” or 
degenerative places. Therefore, area-based schemes are initiated as a special form of 
intervention as they usually apply to a specific neighbourhood, district, or geographic setting.  
Taking an area-based focus has been a favored form of intervention deployed by 
governments around the world seeking to revive “distressed” communities, “failing” local 
economies, and derelict urban “wastelands”. Since the 1960s, United Kingdom (UK) 
governments, for example, have engineered numerous top-down area-based regeneration 
initiatives such as Urban Development Corporations (Punter, 2007). However, government-
led urban renewal programmes have an even longer lineage, including slum clearance 
programmes, which were popular in both the US and UK from the 1930s. While securing 
public sector support (especially financial aid) is a core aspect of most regeneration ventures, 
not all are initiated by governmental actors. Some area-based strategies evolve in a more 
organic, bottom-up manner, and these cases tend to rely on the leadership, skills, and 
dedication of local stakeholders, including residents, business owners, and community 
development professionals. There are also area-based regeneration projects that fused some 
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top-down characteristics, such as public policy tools, with bottom-up dispositions, such as 
community leadership.  
During the 1980s NPM principles started to gain popularity in capitalist political 
economies, such as the US and UK, as the economic bottom line rationale of corporate 
decision-making appealed to those championing the restructuring of the Keynesian welfare 
state (Hood, 1995; Pollitt et al., 2007). This ideology sought to bring the manager ialist 
techniques of the corporate sector to bear on the bureaucratic tendencies of the public sector. 
Guided by the doctrine that managerialist techniques (e.g. use of targets) produce the most 
effective “results” helped to support the notion that professional cadres of “objective” 
managers were required. Consequently, a new manageria list discourse gained traction, under 
which evidence of “success” tended to equate to measurable outputs and deliverables, and 
which influenced the design and direction of urban regeneration programmes. It is NPM ideas 
that underpin the standards of evidence-based policy and decision-making. 
During the 1990s, buoyed by a NPM dogma, the UK’s Conservative Government 
introduced the competitive “challenge funding” approach, which included initiatives such as 
City Challenge and the Single Regeneration Budget. The guiding principle was that 
prospective recipients of regeneration resources would have to bid for national pots of 
funding, which was deemed to “drive up” standards and “reward success”. This philosophical 
outlook drew on an ethos of competitiveness, under which competition is deemed to spawn 
innovation, creativity and entrepreneurialism. Different regeneration schemes around the 
country were therefore pitched against one another, challenged to compete for finite 
resources.  
Between 1997 and 2010, successive Labour Governments moderated the use of 
challenge funds through the creation of some flagship needs-based programmes, such as New 
Deal for Communities (Dargan, 2009), although not to an extent that a requirement to 
Page 6 of 31 
 
compete for public sector funds was completely reversed (Pugalis & McGuinness, 2013). 
Analysts observe that the process has been justified on the basis of “value for money” criteria 
(Dargan, 2009), which has continued under a Conservative-Liberal Democrats “Coalition” 
Government since 2010 (Pugalis & McGuinness, 2013) through the language of “competitive 
tension” (Pugalis & Bentley, 2013). Critics have argued that this system is tilted in favour of 
opportunity, rather than need (Brownill, 2007), but this has failed to affect the prevailing 
ideologies of “doing more with less” that permeate political discourse in an era of austerity.  
A critical point to note is that it is those devising urban policies who set the 
parameters for action, influencing who should act, how success is to be defined, and how 
success is to be measured. Conceptualizing area-based regeneration as an activity involved in 
the much broader social practice of spatial reproduction draws attention to the complexity of 
the process. Indeed, the regeneration process cannot be simplified as a mechanistic logic of 
capitalism, but is an often dysfunctional course of social conflict, everyday relations and 
discursive struggles. Regeneration is a changeable, context-specific activity.  
Consistent with the epistemological concerns informing the research documented in 
the present paper, Kisby (2011) argues for an incessant political debate of “facts”, 
“evidence”, “values”, and “interpretations” that are the platform for often taken- for-granted 
ideological presuppositions. Foucault (1984) provides a much broader critique of disciplinary 
techniques of power. It is this post-positivist view that has provided the inspiration to 
examine the methodological distinction between the accuracy and precision of regeneration 
targetry frameworks. Although often used synonymously in professional discourse and 
everyday debates, their distinction produces important methodological implications. For 
example, accuracy may be achieved by a regeneration scheme that is deemed to have met its 
objective(s). However, a measurement, such as a specified regeneration target, can a lso be 
precisely met without accurately achieving its objective(s). This may occur repeatedly during 
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the regeneration process to the extent that a series of precise, yet inaccurate, measures hit 
their targets but miss the original point of pursuing a regeneration intervention.2  
Despite the comprehensive nature of regeneration projects and the complexity of 
processes entailed, the capturing of regeneration outcomes can often be oversimplified as part 
of attempts to objectively assess what works and measure achievements – or at a minimum, 
to provide the impression that an objective assessment has taken place. Such tactics may be 
deployed to appease funders or gain popularity with the broader public. Conforming to a 
professional disciplinary framework that limits alternative objectives and activities (Foucault, 
1984; Lefebvre, 2003 [1970]), independent consultants, advisors and professionals, for 
example, often present their objective findings in final texts, which remove any hint of 
contradiction or disagreement.  
The limitations of conceptual tools, research methods or policy frames – all 
disciplining the investigative and deliberative space – are conveniently silenced to support the 
socially constructed problem and politically infused solution. Indeed, on some occasions 
independent consultants are appointed to rubber-stamp pre-conceived political and 
ideological objectives, to present the air of credibility and transparency that evidence-based 
policy-making demands. This line of thought allows some to argue that in recent times there 
has been “a focus on policies intended to persuade the local public, rather than represent it” 
(Lovering, 2011, p. 592). Hence, even area-based endeavors purporting to be “community-
led” or “for the community” have been critiqued for marginalizing those interests that they 
are purporting to support (Dreier et al., 2013; Harvey, 1973). Henri Lefebvre, therefore, 
advocates the use of “radical critique” to reveal the ideological predispositions inherent in 
“objective” targets (Lefebvre, 2003 [1970], p. 67).  
 
Sunniside: background and location 
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Sunderland, on the eastern coast, is the largest city in Britain between Edinburgh and Leeds, 
with a resident population exceeding 275,000. However, it remains peripheral, geographically 
and economically, and its population is gradually shrinking (Centre for Cities, 2013). Its 
origins can be traced to Anglo-Saxon times, but it was its coal exporting and shipbuilding 
exploits during the British Industrial Revolution that helped to produce a globally significant 
economic space.  
Nevertheless, facing deindustrialization from the 1930s onwards, over recent decades 
Sunderland has more often than not been associated with malaise than it has with 
rejuvenation (Leunig & Swaffield, 2008; Pugalis, 2012). Consequently, Sunderland tends to 
benefit from most governmental-backed regeneration funding sources due to its fragile 
economy. The case of Sunniside, although historically distinct, is useful for research 
purposes, as its development trajectory shares similarities with other places around the world 
challenged by deindustrialization and global economic restructuring, such as the so-called 
Rustbelt of the American Midwest.  
Sunniside is a dense urban quarter covering approximately 17 ha, immediately to the 
east of Sunderland’s retail and commercial core. A century and a half ago, Sunniside was a 
thriving area, home to rich merchants who resided in grand townhouses. But during the latter 
decades of the 20th century it entered a period of sustained decline as local businesses moved 
away to alternative parts of the region and the built heritage fell into various states of 
disrepair. It subsequently acquired a reputation in the late 1990s as “a place in need of 
resuscitating,” according to research participants (and supported by secondary sources). To 
recount the words of a Sunderland property consultant, the area was calling out for “a bit of 
pump-priming and a bit of external cash.”  
In the early 2000s, the area was represented by the policy community as “the 
forgotten merchant city of Sunderland”.  At a meeting in July 2001, and reflecting growing 
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concerns about the area and its “unfulfilled [economic] potential,” the Sunniside Area 
Regeneration Strategy, prepared by consultants Urban Cultures and David Lock Associates 
(2001), was endorsed by Sunderland City Council’s Cabinet. Providing a brand name, the 
Sunniside Area Regeneration Initiative (SARI), helped to demonstrate “official” conviction. 
In effect, the publication of the strategy established public sector aspirations, helping to 
generate urban policy momentum and some investor interest. The 2001 vision for Sunniside 
thus marks a crucial watershed in the area’s restructuring. It made visible Sunniside’s 
untapped potential and attempted to position it clearly on investors’ maps. At the same time 
other physical, social, cultural, and symbolic aspects of Sunniside’s social space were made 
invisible, especially the local population of hostel dwellers, and people whom some 
regenerators characterized as  “winos” and “druggies” during the reimaging exercise. During 
the next decade, the regeneration vision for Sunniside evolved as projects began to be 
realized and targets were met.  
 
Case study methods 
Using Sunniside as an entry point in terms of urban politics, governance, and policy, this 
article draws on empirical research generated with people in the frontline of a neighbourhood 
undergoing revitalization, including residents, business owners, visitors, community 
representatives, politicians, and professionals. The latter included project managers, 
conservation officers, planners, surveyors, appraisal officers, designers, community 
development officers, and regeneration practitioners.  
Reflecting dissatisfaction with the gathering momentum of orthodox policy analysis 
during the last 30 years, the study adopted an interpretive form of analysis grounded in local 
knowledge (Geertz, 1983). Applying interpretive policy analysis, the research methodology 
was but one of the many possible entrances to re-presenting the regeneration process from a 
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particular situated perspective. “Partial truths” are reformulated (Clifford, 1986) and 
interpreted from the “subject positions” of plural groups and individuals (Lyotard, 1984 
[1979]) to re-present the urban restructuring of Sunniside to date. Moving away from 
research standards dominated by positivist values, such as the ideals of objectivity3 and 
rationality, this research concentrates on post-positivist concerns, such as fragmentation. 
Nevertheless, subjectivity does not necessarily refute or imply that no patterns, trends or 
themes are able to emerge. Interpretations, therefore, remain tentative in recognition of a 
range of possible abstractions, meanings and representations.  
The investigation of urban change was approached by viewing the urban landscape as 
the research laboratory, where one could gain a feel for the place over the course of several 
years. Nevertheless, what this did not adequately disclose were the deal-making procedures 
and incidences of power plays taking place behind the closed doors of committee rooms and 
others arenas of governance. Therefore, participant observations of policy spaces helped to 
grasp institutional inner workings and dealings; highlight how funding proposals were 
scripted and the predispositions framing such decisions; unearth the involvement, roles and 
responsibilities of different actors; observe with whom people speak and interact and with 
whom they do not; reveal the power relations at play and highlight the personalities involved; 
and unpack the struggles over the type and form of regeneration.  
Adopting the snowball sampling procedure, which started with officers involved in 
the regeneration of Sunniside, prearranged interviews were conducted with regenerators (n = 
75), lasting from approximately 40 minutes to over 2 hours. These had merit in accessing the 
partial stories of those primarily engaged in shaping urban space and those with self- interest 
in the regeneration of Sunniside. On-street interviews were also conducted (n = 165), which 
were deemed to be a useful means of uncovering local conceptualizations of the regeneration 
process. A key advantage of this method was the ability to elicit insights from local residents, 
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regular users/visitors (e.g. local employees), as well as less frequent visitors (e.g. tourists) and 
those that used spaces in the vicinity of Sunniside but rarely or never frequented Sunniside. 
These interviews were typically much shorter in duration than those that were prearranged, 
the reason why a much larger number of on-street interviews were conducted. It is too 
simplistic to identify the prearranged interviews with professiona ls and the on-street 
interviews with community interests. It is better to associate the former interviews as focused 
on those occupying positions of relative power, which included community representatives or 
politicians involved in the various decision-making processes, and the latter as those less 
involved in the governance of Sunniside.  
A reflexive multi-method research approach was used to help counteract the method 
effect from using a single approach. It permitted the navigation of multidimensional accounts, 
while taking different bearings on the same phenomena. Yanow (2000) argued that such a 
strategy adds depth, richness, and complexity to research accounts. Even so, the research is 
by no means without limitations. There is no foolproof way of checking that interpretations 
are correct, hence the reason for an iterative process of reflexivity, critical questioning, and 
tackling issues from multiple perspectives.  
This article analyses the diverse subject positions of plural groups and individuals to 
challenge the official regeneration outcomes. Thus, no singular “truth” is forthcoming: 
“Readers will have to discover their own path and truth inside the case” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 
238). The hope is that the empirically grounded analysis offers readers new perspectives on 
issues that are often taken for granted. 
 
The institutional jigsaw 
Sunniside Partnership (SP) was established in 2003 as a not- for-profit organization, trailing 
the launch of the SARI by two years. The partnership was originally expected to operate for a 
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time period of 15 years, but subsequently closed in December 2010. Though lacking 
executive powers, its founding partners were the Regional Development Agency (One North 
East), an Urban Regeneration Company (Sunderland ARC), and the municipal government 
(Sunderland City Council). Each of these core partners brought regenerative-related 
legislative instruments to bear, including compulsory purchase and planning powers, as well 
as financial and human capital. The primary funders were the Regional Development 
Agency, which received a budget from central government departments and was directly 
responsible to ministers.  
The partnership was an example of those which the Regional Development Agency 
pursued during the mid-2000s as it sought to retreat from being an active delivery partner to a 
more strategic organization.4 This corporate policy move also supported the views of 
individual actors. For example, the self-ascribed “key Agency contact” for the regeneration of 
Sunniside perceived himself as the “back seat developer and deliverer.” Described by some 
actors as a more “neutral” vehicle, this position was favored by the Regional Development 
Agency, which – in line with the NPM doxy – perceived that a partnership would improve 
effectiveness. Projects were still delivered within an accountability framework, but without 
political oversight of day-to-day operations. In other words, the arrangement circumvented 
excessive public bureaucracy but retained control via performance management systems.  
As an arms- length extended enterprise, SP operated as a one-stop-shop for 
regeneration within the area, reporting to a Partnership Board and collaborating within a 
structure of care with overlapping groupings of interest groups, such as developers. 
Spearheaded by the partnership’s project director and a small team of officers, the 
governance structure overseeing Sunniside’s regeneration strategy included an assemblage of 
loosely coupled, but interdependent, organizations involved in urban governance. This 
included public agencies, departments, and bodies with overlapping and sometimes 
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conflicting mandates, meshed with some apparent and less obvious private interests and, 
arguably, tokenistic community representatives. For example, the Sunniside Forum that was 
intended to provide a mechanism for engaging community interests only met annually and 
failed to develop beyond a consultative forum, which it can be said conforms with tokenistic 
forms of citizen participation (Arnstein, 1969). Interviews corroborated by participant 
observations suggested that despite some initial hope for an active community role, the 
demands placed on officers, which they referred to as “the day job” (i.e. delivering targets), 
took precedence. In contrast, the Partnership Board and Sunniside Working Group convened 
more frequently – usually monthly. The key social development organization at the time was 
the Back on the Map New Deal for Communities Partnership, but they reported feeling 
“disconnected” from the work of SP. 
The design and core membership of SP can be understood as a means to control the 
transformation of Sunniside’s urban landscape, controlling the opaque institutional spaces 
that each claimed a legitimate regeneration role and also the forms of regeneration to be 
realized. 
Stakeholders and other societal actors viewed SP in divergent ways, from “a holistic 
undertaking” to “an arm of the Council.” Less disputed was the partnership’s raison-d’etre to 
move Sunniside to a position of economic vitality, from a grant-dependant area to one in 
which projects were market-driven:   
 
The Partnership’s reason for being is to make Sunniside a place where the private 
sector has sufficient assistance and confidence to invest …. One of our main aims is 
to spend as little public money as possible and in return attract as much private sector 
investment. (Sunniside Partnership, 2005, p. 3) 
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According to the project director, the role of the partnership was “to plug the gaps, to 
undertake demonstration projects, provide financial assistance (until market conditions are 
more robust) to ensure that the private sector has the confidence to invest in Sunniside.” In 
the words of a senior manager of Sunderland ARC, the partnership was about “creating the 
employment space to bring in that [economic] diversity in order to anchor Sunderland’s 
economic prospects.” Such senior figures also publicly referred to the instrumental role of the 
private sector, recognizing that the public sector could not act alone, yet the role of other 
publics, such as local inhabitants, were deafeningly silent through their absence. Indeed, on-
street interviews revealed that a significant number of urban inhabitants felt that regeneration 
was for “others,” such as tourists and property developers, rather than for them in a manner 
that would address their needs.  
There was general agreement between interested parties that the partnership had been 
expected to reverse problems of economic decline, physical decay, and to a lesser degree 
social malaise. This can be termed the official regeneration rationa le.  
 
Setting strategies objectives and measuring “success” 
Sunniside Partnership produced a 14-year Business Plan for the regeneration of the area in its 
first year of operation. An accompanying Delivery Plan for the period 2003/04 to 2008/09 
was also developed, seeking to implement a range of projects to achieve six strategic 
objectives, summarized in Table 1. If all objectives were achieved, SP believed that they 
would have increased the density, usage and economic activity of Sunniside, and thereby 
delivered a “successful” mixed-use community.  
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Table 1. Sunniside strategic objectives . 
Strategic Objective Summary 
 
Strategic Objective 1 – 
Diversification of land uses 
The designation of the area as a mixed–use urban quarter, including 
residential, commercial, leisure, cultural, and retail uses creating 1,000 
new homes and over 500 new jobs to the area 
Strategic Objective 2 – Securing 
appropriate development 
The creation of a vib rant area that supports a quality lifestyle attractive to 
inward investors, current and future businesses and residents 
Strategic Objective 3 – 
Improving the public realm and 
the environment  
Guiding and achieving high quality design and environmental 
improvements to improve security and safety, to maximise Sunniside’s 
historic character and to create a unique, memorable, comfortable, high 
quality urban environment  
Strategic Objective 4 – 
Improving access and car 
parking 
Optimising access, ensuring public safety while balancing the needs of 
all road users and pedestrians 
Strategic Objective 5 – 
Accelerating business 
development 
The expansion of the existing business base to achieve an environment 
that can sustain a stable commercial economy 
Strategic Objective 6 – Raising 
awareness and interest 
A strong image as an integral part of promoting the area 
 
Some public sector-led key projects included spatial quality interventions, including a 
property upgrade initiative, commercial property grant scheme, and the creation of a digital 
media and arts centre. In addition, the delivery of the River Quarter, a private sector- led 
mixed-use development project, was promoted as the regeneration of Sunniside being a 
definitive success (see Table 2). However, as noted earlier, success is a multidimensional 
concept. It is relative, subjective and depends on the problems that a project seeks to address. 
Indeed, problems, or more precisely the process of problematization, selectively identifies, 
crafts, and socially constructs issues. Thus, problems are discursive productions as much as 
empirical realities (Kisby, 2011).  
Therefore, the ideological basis of indicators devised to measure the achievement of 
outcomes via recorded outputs is significant. This may help to explain why during the period 
that the regeneration of Sunniside was promoted as a success, the city of Sunderland’s 
population continued to decline (by 3.2 per cent or 9,100 between 2001 and 2011) with little 
indication that there had been a substantial improvement in the socioeconomic conditions of 
Sunniside’s (and its surroundings) indigenous communities. 
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Table 2. Major regeneration projects . 
Major regeneration 
projects 
Funding partners  Total capital cost 
Mowbray Park and Winter 
Gardens and Museum 
Main funder: 
Heritage Lottery  
Others: 
City Council, Northumbrian Water,  
Wolfson Foundation, Friends of Sunderland 
Museums 
£13.3 million 
Sunniside Commercial 
Property Grant Scheme 
Main funder: 
Regional Development Agency 
Others: 
Tyne and Wear Sub-Regional Partnership 
£2 million 
Property conversations and  
redevelopments 
Main funders: 
Regional Development Agency, English 
Partnerships 
Others: 
City Council, Tyne and Wear Sub-Regional 
Partnership, Sunderland Housing 
Group/Gentoo, private sector partners 
£15 million plus 
The River Quarter Main funder: 
Helios Properties 
Others: 
Emperor Property Management, City Council, 
Regional Development Agency  
£6 million 
 
£8 million 
Sunniside Gardens Main funder: 
Regional Development Agency 
Others: 
English Partnerships 
£2.2 million 
Manor Hotel/ 
West Sunniside: the Place 
Main funder: 
Regional Development Agency 
Others: 
Tyne and Wear Sub-Regional Partnership, 
City Council, European Regional 
Development Fund, 
Heritage Lottery Fund 
£6 million 
Public realm improvement 
works 
Main funder: 
Regional Development Agency 
Others: 
Tyne and Wear Sub-Regional Partnership, 
City Council 
£2.2 million 
 
According to Lefebvre (2003 [1970]), setting (growth) targets in the form of strategic 
objectives only serves to construe development means as ends in themselves. Exposing some 
of the “myths and realities of regeneration,” Glynn argues that “[s]uccess is measured in the 
opportunities created for private developers to reap large profits” (2006, p. 4). In accordance 
with such a perspective, it is argued that the success of the SARI, and through association, the 
partnership, was ultimately determined in the eyes of the state by how much private sector 
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investment was leveraged and the number of businesses enticed to the area (see Sunniside 
Partnership, 2004). This is clearly evident in “the partnership’s raison-d’etre” analyzed 
above.  
A dominant economic logic is explicit in the East Sunniside Masterplan project 
application, which received substantial public sector funding from the Regional Development 
Agency. It states that “[t]he critical success factor is to ensure a momentum of private sector 
investment is maintained” and “[t]he long term benefits … will be measurable from the 
successful regeneration of the Sunniside area and the attraction of firms and developers into 
the area by upgrading the urban landscape” (Sunderland ARC, 2007, p. 13 & 24). In a policy 
terrain that conceives of regeneration as a means of delivering economic growth beyond all 
else (Pugalis & McGuinness, 2013), Sunniside’s approach to regeneration should not be a 
great surprise. 
Output narratives are prevalent in regeneration discourse where places – and 
consequently place-based projects – are framed as directly competing in spatial contests for 
finite inputs including consumers. Regeneration schemes are also positioned to compete for 
finite public sector resources, as highlighted above in relation to the prevalence of challenge 
funds since the 1990s. Table 3, below, describes the key output targets set for the SARI over 
its 14-year business planning period and the proportion of these targets achieved after year 4.  
Table 3. SARI’s init ial anticipated outputs  and achieved targets. 
Indicator 14-yr 
target 
Year 3  
2005/6 
(outputs) 
Year 4  
2006/7 
(outputs) 
Total Achieved target 
by year 4  
Private sector investment £m 100 23.4 30.38 53.78 54% 
Public sector investment £m 20 1.2 4.4 7.51 38% 
Total public and private 
sector investment £m 
130 24.6 34.78 61.35 47% 
New jobs created 500 200 39 39 48% 
Brownfield land redeveloped 
(acres) 
7 1.20 1.22 2.42 35% 
New residential dwellings 900 77 140 217 24% 
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Indicator 14-yr 
target 
Year 3  
2005/6 
(outputs) 
Year 4  
2006/7 
(outputs) 
Total Achieved target 
by year 4  
New/improved commercial 
space  
(sq. m.) 
5,000 3,732 694 4,246 85% 
New/improved retail space na na 214 214 na 
New/improved leisure space na 2,757 5.074 7,831 na 
Total floo rspace additions na 6,489 5.982 12,471 na 
Construction jobs 700 50 58 108 15% 
Source: Sunniside Annual Review 06-07 
 
 Notice that private sector investment occupies the first row of SP’s expected outputs 
table, demonstrating the importance in which it was held by the partners of Sunniside. 
Indeed, the Regional Development Agency’s capital investment criteria also stressed the 
significance of private sector “leverage.” The indicator with potentially the most direct 
benefit for local inhabitants – construction jobs (occupying the bottom row) – arguably 
“makes the list because they are easy enough to record, but what we’re really bothered about 
is private investment and businesses attracted to the area.” (Development Agency Advisor, 
personal communication, 29 October 2007). 
  Moreover, the level of public sector investment was considered an output in itself (see 
above critique by Lefebvre, 2003 [1970]). Again, this is due to national and European 
funding bodies who seek public sector match funding when committing to invest in a project. 
Thus, in some circumstances securing funding for regeneration is viewed by some 
professionals as the “main prize” – how such funds are dispersed and utilized can often be a 
secondary concern. 
 
Hard targets, the hierarchy of outputs and negotiations 
Evaluating the outcomes of regeneration in the Bay area of Cardiff, Punter (2007) found that 
hard targetry outputs sideline design ambitions and qualitative attributes (see the earlier 
methodological distinction between accuracy and precision). Some members of Sunniside’s 
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institutional jigsaw drew attention to the “over-emphasis on the physical and the harder 
aspects of the economic,” with one community regeneration manager “plead[ing] a case that 
there’s more thought given to the social.”  
Other research participants were also critical of such “short-sightedness,” but drew 
attention to the difficulties of utilizing alternative targets and measurement procedures. Such 
situated perspectives help to highlight how the “softer” side of regeneration tends to be 
displaced by “harder” outputs (Lefebvre, 2003 [1970]). Hence, things that can be counted 
(the quantifiable) tend to count most in measuring project success. This explains why some of 
Sunniside’s six strategic objectives do not attempt to devise a single output target to help 
monitor and measure whether these objectives are being achieved (see Table 1 and 2).  
More positively, such criticisms prompted the Regional Development Agency to 
introduce a design checklist, with which all capital projects seeking funding support were 
expected to comply. But even so, a member of the senior management team who was 
responsible for “policing” the design checklist and agreeing projects “in principle” openly 
declared (during a meeting between regeneration officers) that “so long as we are happy with 
the overall economic impact and can establish the links between the strategic narrative and 
project- level outputs” securing funding “will not be a problem.” This would imply that there 
is an unwritten hierarchy of outputs, whereby economic indicators of success reign supreme. 
The importance of economic facets to the regeneration of Sunniside (see Strategic Objective 
5, Table 1), and regeneration schemes more broadly, is indisputable, but the partners of 
Sunniside devised five other strategic objectives, which related to social and environmental 
components of regeneration consistent with holistic notions of regeneration. 
What is also interesting about the official output targets which the SARI, and 
therefore the partnership, was charged with delivering, was not only the heightened presence 
of hard outputs such as leverage, but also the absence of softer measures. In recalling the six 
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strategic objectives for the regeneration of Sunniside, shown in Table 1, what becomes 
apparent is a gap in the logic cha in between achieving these and delivering the quantitative 
outputs shown in Table 3. One would assume that the six strategic objectives guided the 
overall regeneration of Sunniside. If this is so, then one would have expected the hard outputs 
to flow from each of the strategic objectives, but this was obviously not the case. Examining 
strategic objective 3, “enhancing the public realm,” as an example, it is worrying to see that 
none of the expected outputs was aligned with addressing this objective.  
Consistent with a NPM ethos, a target could have been constructed relating to the 
physical area of public realm enhanced (e.g. sq. m. of pavement improved or quantity of new 
street furniture). Alternatively, both positivist and post-positivist ex-ante and ex-post studies 
may have helped to demonstrate the extent to which this strategic objective had been 
achieved. This could have involved visual surveys as well as surveying user perceptions. 
Appreciative forms of enquiry may also help some community groups make visible what is 
valued or considered to work well, rather than other diagnostic tools that are more inclined to 
make visible the perceived problems. Measures of success need not be limited to a narrow 
range of quantifiable metrics (although these remain the favored tools of governmental and 
non-governmental funders). Several alternatives exist.5 
During interviews with regenerators, discussions focused on capturing qualitative 
shifts in Sunniside’s purported regeneration. Some actors were puzzled when asked how the 
creation of “a unique, memorable, comfortable, high quality environment” (Strategic 
Objective 3) would be recorded, monitored, and analyzed. Others responded that “so long as 
the main outputs are being achieved [and in many cases exceeded] there’s not an issue” 
(Development Agency Surveyor, personal communication, 11 September 2007).  
As Table 3 demonstrates, SP may well have been exceptional in hitting their output 
targets, but in doing so, did the partners of Sunniside miss the point? 6 If one agrees that the 
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outputs are an unsuitable proxy measure for the strategic objectives, then one must seriously 
question whether it was the latter guiding the former, as the official regeneration narrative 
would have one believe. If it was the reverse logic where selective outputs guided the more 
embracing strategic objectives, then there is a danger that such narrowly conceived outputs 
directed attention towards select issues (e.g. exchange value) at the expense of others (e.g. 
use value) (Lefebvre, 2003 [1970]; Molotch, 1976). 
 The argument, therefore, is not that regenerators may be intentionally subverting 
holistic regeneration visions and strategic objectives, but rather, that a limited range of output 
targets undermines attempts to work towards delivering anything that is not being officially 
measured, monitored, and assessed. In the case of Sunniside, many regenerators were well 
aware of the principles of holistic forms of regeneration and some actors passionately 
conveyed this. However, working under the constraints of time, finances, and other resources, 
coupled with management systems, reporting frameworks, and accountability processes, such 
principles and passion were undermined by the procedural factors of regeneration. In a more 
recent UK government development example, the national regeneration framework was 
deemed bureaucratic, and has since been replaced by a much more streamlined toolkit 
intended to support community- led regeneration (see Pugalis & McGuinness, 2013). 
Table 4. SARI investment profile . 
 
 
2003/04 2004/05 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009+ Total 
Private 
Investment 
 
£15.1m 
 
£21.4m 
 
£8.0m 
 
£9.0m 
 
£11.0m 
 
£41.0m 
 
£111.0m 
Public 
Investment 
 
£2.0m 
 
£4.0m 
 
£3.0m 
 
£2.0m 
 
£2.0m 
 
£11.5m 
 
£24.5m 
Total  
£17.1m 
 
£25.4m 
 
£11.0m 
 
£11.0m 
 
£13.0m 
 
£52.5m 
 
£135.5m 
Source: Sunniside Partnership (2006).  
 
Over SARI’s originally envisaged lifetime, public sector investment was expected to 
reach nearly £25m (£5m more than originally programmed), and in turn this was expected to 
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“lever in” a minimum of £100m of private investment (see Table 4).7 The target set for the 
scale of private sector investment to be leveraged was increased to £111m in 2003, and then 
raised again in 2004/05 to £120m, although in 2008/09 it was then renegotiated and lowered 
in light of the credit crunch having a severe impact on the construction industry. However, an 
analysis shows that even the revised lower target was set with significant headroom. 
Factoring in a safety zone is common practice between funding bodies, such as Regional 
Development Agencies and delivery partners. This is where “consultants are worth their 
weight in gold,” revealed one regeneration practitioner, whilst he recounted that he had “done 
the Agency out of a stack of outputs,” which is consistent with the view that some  
“objective” projections are used to legitimize policy actions that are far-removed from 
everyday market and social conditions (Punter, 2007). 
Participant observation supported by interviews helped to clarify that an extended 
“negotiation process” usually took place between the funding partner (e.g. Regional 
Development Agency) and the delivery partner (e.g. SP). It is unclear what role, if any, 
community interests and representatives performed in this process. However, based on the 
accounts of research participants and the Sunniside Forum, it could be inferred that their 
input was rather limited. During the negotiation process ha rd outputs were anxiously 
negotiated as softer outcomes generally were agreed in a less problematic fashion. This is 
because the targetry framework – which the Agency’s performance was primarily judged 
against – exclusively focused on hard output measures. Softer outcomes are often “added to 
the melting pot … to ‘pad out’ the speculative benefits and appease other interest [groups]” 
(Development Agency Property Advisor, personal communication, 27 September 2007 ). This 
was primarily the only discursive space where community groups were permitted to influence 
the nature of outcomes. It amounted to little more than a technique of community persuasion 
(Lovering, 2011). 
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Interviews with SP officers – prior to the credit crunch – revealed a supreme 
confidence that they would not only exceed the 14-year targets set but “completely smash 
them,” in the words of the project director. Another officer claimed that the partnership was 
likely to “double the outputs,” but countered that targets “hadn’t been officially adjusted as 
nobody wants to come unstuck.” Such claims directly undermine NPM discourse that often 
claims to negotiate “stretching targets.” Table 3 appears to justify officer confidence of 
exceeding targets, with over 50 percent of the initial private sector gearing ratio target being 
achieved by year 4. But does this directly infer that the SARI was making a substantial 
positive difference to the many businesses, inhabitants and users of Sunniside and the wider 
area? Do these outputs reveal anything about the success of SARI, or do they reveal more 
about the actors that negotiated these outputs? Little public attention was paid to the type and 
nature of many of these outputs (but may have been a conscious act by those negotiating 
targets); especially lacking was broad public debate.  
Although strategic outcomes, output targets, and financial accounts were all 
transparent and publicly available, active and diverse community input was largely absent ; 
the institutional jigsaw governing the regeneration of Sunniside involved some elite business 
actors and property interests but engaged with few residents. There were some forms of 
community resistance, for example from the displaced businesses and hostel dwellers, which 
were each deemed “unsightly,” but this had little effect on shaping the official regeneration 
rationale. Hence, no relocation strategy was ever devised for these groups of Sunniside’s 
community. This raises further questions about “regeneration for whom?” and the roles 
performed by targetry frameworks in this process.  
It is the qualitative dimensions that are arguably crucial (Lefebvre, 2003 [1970]), 
because indices, datasets, and outputs can only go so far in helping one understand the social 
production of space. James Jones argues that professional experts use “mechanical language,” 
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whereby “milestones and outcomes are the impersonal results of the process of change.” 
(2009, p. 283-284)  Consequently, the “regeneration speak” of “quick wins”, supported by a 
phraseology of “triggers, levers, buttons, targets and switches,” loses sight of social justice 
ideals as the doxy of NPM takes hold: “The qualitative is worn down. Anything that cannot 
be quantified is eliminated. The generalized terrorism of the quantifiable accentuates the 
efficiency of repressive space, amplifies it without fear and without reproach, all the more so 
because of its self-justifying nature (ideo- logic), its apparent scientificity” (Lefebvre, 2003 
[1970], p. 185).  
 Several findings of broader significance can be derived from the case of Sunniside. 
First, the official sanctioning or recognition of a regeneration project can help to galvanize 
broad stakeholder support, generate increased awareness and help maximize positive 
development impacts. It tends to set the course of future action. Nevertheless, the 
officialization of regeneration endeavors should not necessarily be automatically accepted as 
a good thing that can be left to the powerbrokers and professionals.  
Second, the mere launch of a partnership structure does not always result in more 
enhanced community empowerment. Some partnerships are tasked with delivering the 
regeneration of a specific area in a manner that may not reflect and represent the wishes of 
place-based communities. Sadly, this remains a recurring criticism of area-based regeneration 
schemes.  
Third, hard targets are likely to remain important in assessing the performance and 
overall “success” of area-based regeneration initiatives, and other forms of community 
development. They are often used in headline-grabbing success stories and lobbying 
campaigns. Yet, this research has revealed the limitations of a narrow range of outputs 
overriding strategic objectives: the tail should not be left to wag the dog.  
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Fourth, in recognition of the hegemonic target-based culture, the absence of particular 
targets, such as those relating to social or environmental goals, may warrant closer 
community scrutiny and, potentially, challenge. After all, absent targets can result in absent 
debate. Community visioning processes and engagement activities, therefore, appear crucial. 
Nevertheless, these alone are likely to be insufficient, especially if they do not influence the 
adoption of socio-environmental output targets or more radically lead to alternative forms of 
measuring “success.”  
Fifth, local development groups, individual community actors and activists face a 
continual struggle to centrally position the importance of local knowledge (and especially 
community insights) in a professionalized arena that remains dominated by supposedly 
objective new managerialist predispositions. This draws attention to the temporal aspects of 
regeneration and the requirement to refine or revise objectives and measurement systems as 
the need arises. Therefore, local knowledges could be utilized to help to monitor regeneration 
schemes, which are a significant departure from those projects that consider it necessary to 
consult communities only at the start of the process, typically involving periodic update 
activities.  
Sixth, it is important that official outputs that perform the function of indicators of 
success are stretching so that public values are maximized rather than private profits. This 
principle would appear to be a prerequisite of all funding agencies in an era of fiscal 
austerity. If Sunniside had followed some of these principles, then its regeneration might 
have stood a better chance of being considered a success from a public and private sector and 
community perspective. The concern of this study has not been to examine whether the 
regeneration of Sunniside succeeded or failed, but how, under the guise of transparency, 
target-setting that focuses exclusively on output indicators can subvert holistic regeneration 
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objectives. Thus, the paper has sought to demonstrate how this neglected aspect of 
regeneration performs a decisive role in shaping the eventual outcomes.  
 
Conclusion 
Regeneration is not necessarily a “good thing,” an a priori positive, although it can often 
appear that “everybody is a winner,” based on a superficial assessment of strategic objectives, 
visions and official regeneration strategies. In response, Lefebvre calls for “radical critique,” 
based on an understanding that “there is always some distance between elaboration and 
execution” (Lefebvre, 2003 [1970], p. 136).  
Using a single case study as the urban laboratory to investigate the case of the 
“successful” Sunniside Area Regeneration Initiative, this paper has critically analyzed 
whether a regeneration scheme hitting all the official targets necessarily equates to hitting the 
point of regeneration. Through a critique of narrowly constructed (economic) targets and of 
NPM principles more broadly understood, the paper has utilized empirical research material 
to demonstrate that in the case of Sunniside the point of yielding broader (community) 
outcomes had been missed. Accepting that SARI was a good thing sought at the outset to 
limit a deeper debate of what the actual point of the regeneration scheme was. Therefore, the 
case study has revealed the distance between strategic objectives and the execution validated 
by a limited repertoire of hard outputs. By failing to put in place an adequate baseline 
position – including qualitative as well as quantitative measures – SP has perhaps protected 
itself from criticism. Achieving targets and surpassing official expectations recorded via a 
narrow range of hard outputs helped to secure political acceptability and normalize new 
managerialist ideological predispositions. This is not too dissimilar to thousands of other 
regeneration scenarios around the world, which have neglected to devise a locally responsive 
methodology that shapes future interventions and maximizes social outcomes. It also serves 
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as a caution against the effectiveness of output-driven regeneration strategies. Indeed, such an 
approach can significantly influence the design and direction of urban regeneration 
programmes, although this may not always be immediately apparent.  
The main findings of the study support the argument that new managerialist targetry 
frameworks effectively work to make visible the economic success stories that are scripted to 
endorse regeneration schemes, whilst simultaneously working to make less visible (or even 
render invisible) the failure to strengthen community capacities. It is this form of hegemonic 
practice that conflates development means or targets, such as private sector investment, as the 
end point of regeneration in themselves. Challenging dominant regeneration discourses may 
help to activate debates involving both the espoused recipients of regeneration as well as the 
managerialist regenerators to consider questions, such as regeneration by whom and for 
whom?  
Throughout this paper it has been contended that a greater onus should be placed on 
deliberating the point of regeneration, perhaps in advance of attempting to devise innovative 
methods for measuring community. There remains a critical need to challenge taken-for-
granted facts and destabilize ideological presuppositions, after all success remains a relational 
and evolving multidimensional concept. A pragmatic start may be for community groups to 
perform a lead role in the regeneration diagnostic process and the construction of measures of 
success.  
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1
  “Targetry frameworks” utilise quantitative and sometimes qualitative targets to guide the 
development of regeneration projects. They help to frame regeneration projects and play a 
decisive role in justifying whether a particular scheme has been successful or not.  
2
   The author is grateful for the comments provided by one of the referees for helping to 
refine and clarify the scientific distinction between the “accuracy” and “precision” of 
regeneration targetry frameworks. 
3
  Objectivity, for example, is conceptually impossible from an interpretive perspective: one 
cannot remain detached from the subject of study (Yanow, 2000). 
4
  This trend can be linked with wider decentralisation efforts in the pursuit of greater 
economic and social development and also the management through targets ethos 
associated with NPM doctrines. 
5
  Firstly “narratives of change” can be utilized to draw attention to diverse stakeholder 
accounts recorded at different phases of the regeneration process. These may help to 
generate multi-user perspectives that are temporally rich, which could help to reveal just 
as much about the regeneration process as they may about the outcomes achieved. 
Secondly there are numerous participatory appraisal methods that can generate a cycle of 
learning, reflection and empowerment. Thirdly “live” measures of success could be 
utilized. These could take on a more organic and dynamic form, which could adapt to 
changing circumstances, sensibilities and values.  
6
  In operational terms, the “point” in the case of Sunniside is achieving the six strategic 
objectives set out in Table 3. More broadly and of greater general applicability, the “point” 
of regeneration is to improve intertwined social, environmental and economic conditions 
in an integrated and sustainable manner.  
7
  Not originally considered a “priority project” by Sunderland ARC, by the end of 2010 
Sunniside stood as the ARC’s largest project in terms of public sector investment, despite 
its limited contribution to their targets: anticipated to generate only 500 “new” jobs from 
an ARC target of almost 12,000.  
